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THE END OF THE MUGABE ERA  
IN ZIMBABWE: CHANGE OR CONTINUITY?
Nathaly Silva Xavier Schutz1 
Introduction
Robert Mugabe’s long government, which began with Zimbabwe’s 
independence in 1980, came to an end, almost forty years later, in 2017. 
Mugabe’s downfall is symbolic: while it puts an end to one of the leading 
anti-colonial leaderships still in power in Southern Africa, it brings, especially 
in the view of Western countries, the end of an authoritarian regime and the 
possibility of democratizing reforms.
Zimbabwe has a history of crises and conflicts since its independence. 
The country’s socio-economic development indexes are among the lowest in 
the African Continent and its political conditions and institutions are often 
criticized. The country’s domestic context, however, is much more complex 
than the indicators show and it is strongly related to its external interactions.
The end of the Mugabe era brings to light the prospect of change, 
both political and economic. The end of a long government, as is the case 
in question, is a central moment in the understanding of the trajectory of a 
country, both from a historical point of view and as a possible turning point 
for the future path that will be taken. It should not be forgotten, however, 
that, despite the change in power, there is the maintenance of the party, the 
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU-PF), which points to important 
traces of continuity.
The objective of this article is to, from a historical analysis, understand 
the possible factors that conditioned Mugabe’s retiring from the government 
and the possible changes in the political conditions of the country. It is 
assumed that the country’s external relations, combined with the internal 
1 Course of International Relations, Federal University of Pampa (UNIPAMPA), Santana do 
Livramento, Brazil. E-mail: nathalyx@gmail.com.
130 The end of the Mugabe Era in Zimbabwe: change or continuity?
Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v.3, n.5, Jan./Jun. 2018 | p. 129-145
disputes of ZANU-PF, were the decisive factors in the departure of Mugabe. 
The article is divided into three parts, in addition to this introduction and 
the concluding remarks. The first section will deal with the history of crises 
that the country has presented since its independence, especially the issues 
related to the elections and the confrontation between the government and 
the opposition forces. In the second part, the recent crisis, which culminated 
in Mugabe’s downfall, will be addressed. Finally, an analysis will be made of 
the more immediate effects of this change of power as well as the outlook 
for the country’s political conditions in the short term.
A history of crisis
Zimbabwe was one of the latest African countries to become 
independent, in 1980. In addition to being late, Zimbabwe’s independence, 
unlike other British colonies in the region, was conflictive and marked by 
a significant period of struggle between different groups2. The context of 
colonization and decolonization experienced by the country had a significant 
influence on the emergence of most of the problems faced after independence.
In the words of Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2002, 110):
The Zimbabwean post-colonial state was a product of particularly two 
recent major legacies. Firstly, it was a direct successor of the brutal 
and authoritarian settler colonial state. Secondly, it was the product 
of a protracted nationalist armed struggle. [...] The third element that 
determined the Peace and security perspectives of Zimbabwe was the 
geopolitical realities of the Southern African region. 
The crisis in Zimbabwe began in the late 90s, with the establishment 
of an opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), 
consisting, essentially, of members of unions, urban workers and white 
farmers. The MDC comes as a response to ZANU-PF government’s decision 
to change the Constitution in order to keep Mugabe as head of state. According 
to Cawthra (2010), a referendum was held to decide on the change in the 
Constitution and it didn’t win. In the 2000 elections, as the MDC won seats 
2 Zimbabwe was a British Colony called Southern Rhodesia. In 1965, the white minority 
declared the country’s unilateral independence. What followed, until independence, in 1980, 
was a long period of confrontation between this white minority, united on the Rhodesian 
Front, and the nationalist liberation movements, the Zimbabwe African People’s Union 
(ZAPU) and its dissent, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), led by Mugabe.
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in the legislative and decided to resume discussions about land, in order to 
regain the support of ZANU-PF’s traditional rural electorate, Mugabe lost 
much of his support (Alden 2010 ).
The 2000 elections were accompanied by external observation 
missions. While Commonwealth and European Union observers declared the 
election illegitimate, the Organization of African Unity and SADC missions, 
while acknowledging problems, found that they were insufficient to interfere 
with the final results (Minillo 2011).
This context of instability was marked by actions of ZANU-PF 
supporters, initially aimed at expelling commercial white farmers from their 
land, but it eventually evolved, as well, into the presidential race in 2002. 
It is important to point out, as Farley recalls (2008), that these violent acts 
were not suppressed by the government forces, instead, police forces were 
accomplices of the actions.
These actions were part of a larger context of violence and confrontations 
that preceded the 2002 presidential elections. The actions of the ZANU-PF 
supporter groups included not only violent demonstrations, but also a fraudulent 
voter registration process and even the assassination of opposition parties and 
their supporters. The conjuncture was, therefore, of great crisis, reflecting, 
in part, a historical problem, dating back to the period of decolonization, of 
economic power concentrated in a small white elite (Schutz 2014).
Unlike Western countries, Zimbabwe’s neighbors rarely offer public 
condemnation of the country’s internal problems or government policies. This 
is due, among other things, to historical and structural aspects. As Alden points 
out (2010), some states in the region, such as South Africa and Namibia, had a 
very similar socioeconomic and political structure to Zimbabwe, with a strong 
concentration of land ownership and almost no agrarian reform program 
implemented after the racial segregation regimes. South Africa’s stance, in 
particular, was rather hesitant. Thabo Mbeki, then president, adopted the strategy 
known as  ‘quiet diplomacy’, which consisted in quietly advising Mugabe to 
undertake reforms, but, publicly, supporting his actions3. For the other countries 
in the region, in turn, Mugabe’s position could be seen as a mobilization of 
“regional solidarity campaigns of the recent past” (Alden 2010, 5). 
3 According to Alden (2010), this position was justified in two aspects: the first was economic, 
since Zimbabwe was South Africa’s main trading partner on the Continent and economic 
sanctions would have a very large impact on South African companies. The second issue 
involved the regional effects that Mugabe’s conviction and possible withdrawal from power 
could generate, with a large influx of refugees and a destabilization of the region.
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Likewise, the main regional institution, the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), has always been hesitant in interfering 
with the crisis in Zimbabwe. Instead, SADC initially took a solidarity stand 
with the Zimbabwean government. This position was partially altered at the 
2001 Summit Meeting, in which there was a declaration of concern about 
the crisis situation in Zimbabwe and its possible effects on the region. In 
addition, as Cawthra (2010) recalls, Mugabe was removed from the OPDS4 
Summit Presidency. 
In 2004, as Modeni (2014) points out, as a result of SADC 
recommendations on electoral processes5, two changes were made in 
Zimbabwe’s legislation. The first was the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission 
Act (ZEC), which created a specific commission to deal with electoral matters. 
The second was the Electoral Act, which replaced the old electoral legislation, 
with major changes. Noteworthy are: the polling taking place in a single day; 
counting votes in specific centers; and the creation of an Electoral Court.
The crisis in the country continued to deepen in the following years 
and, in 2008, at the African Union Summit, it was decided the SADC should 
formally act as mediator of the crisis in Zimbabwe. At the SADC Summit a 
few months later, the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, was appointed 
chief mediator. The appointment, according to Cawthra (2011), generated many 
criticisms, especially from MDC, which accused Mbeki of being pro-ZANU-PF.
South Africa’s mediation, which focused in the dialogue between the 
opposition and ZANU-PF, hoped to address a wide range of issues, but led 
to limited results. As Matlosa (2009) points out, minor changes have been 
suggested in some legislations dealing with elections or related topics, such 
as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act; all involved the 
need of changes in the Constitution.
In 2008, new presidential elections took place. The first turn occurred 
without major intercurrences. Between the first and second rounds, however, 
a number of violent actions were committed by ZANU-PF members and 
their supporters, against the MDC, culminating in the withdrawal of the 
4 Organ for Politics, Defense and Security.
5 In 2004, the organization released a document entitled SADC Principles and Guidelines 
Governing Democratic Elections. In addition to specifically naming the principles that 
member countries must follow in the conduct of democratic elections, the document also 
addresses Electoral Observation Missions. The conduction of Electoral Observation Missions 
and the changes in the political context of the region led to the need to revise the principles 
agreed upon in 2004. Thus, in 2015, a revision of the SADC Principles and Guidelines 
Governing Democratic Elections was published.
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opposition candidate (Mutisi 2015). In addition, the MDC opposed holding 
the elections before the changes proposed by SADC mediation and the 
revision of the Constitution took place. The second round, of course, led to 
the victory of ZANU-PF. The SADC Electoral Observation Mission indicated 
that the elections were not free and did not reflect the will of the people of 
Zimbabwe. Other organizations and states also condemned what happened 
in the country, intensifying the crisis.
As an attempt to solve the crisis, less than a month after the elections, 
MDC and ZANU-PF signed a Memorandum of Understanding, creating a 
power-sharing government. The outcome of this document was what became 
known as the Global Political Agreement (GPA). The GPA, which was signed 
still in 2008, would only have an implementation plan in 2010.
A turning point in SADC’s stance would be the 2009 Extraordinary 
Summit, which gave Mugabe time to make reforms in order to hold free and 
fair elections and to implement the GPA. In practice, however, the change of 
position did not yield many results, with small concessions from the Mugabe 
government. It should be noted, however, that, coupled with the GPA, a 
process of revision and adaptation of legislation began, culminating, in 2013, 
in the promulgation of a new Constitution (Chirambo and Motsamai 2016).
The proposal for the new Constitution was presented, in 2012, by a 
Parliamentary Committee. The changes included greater limits to the power 
of the President and greater independence of the Executive and Legislative 
branches (Modeni 2014). After a referendum, it was, as already mentioned, 
enacted in 2013.
In 2013, new elections were held, keeping Mugabe and ZANU-PF 
in power and ending the government coalition that had been established in 
2009 (BTI 2016). MDC leaders once again challenged the results and called 
for new elections, even though the SADC Observation Mission recognized 
the elections as legitimate. Clashes between the opposition and government 
forces continued to take place throughout 2014, aggravated by ZANU-PF’s 
announcement that Mugabe would once again be a candidate in the 2018 
elections (International Crisis Group 2016).
The crisis in the country continued to develop with violent actions 
from all sides and even internal disputes in both the opposition and the 
government. Reflecting these disputes, a new party was created in 2015, 
People First, the result of a split within ZANU-PF. One of the main issues 
of disagreement was the possibility of the First Lady, Grace Mugabe, taking 
place as presidential candidate instead of her husband.
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It is important to note, however, that Zimbabwe had shown signs of a 
gradual improvement in political conditions since 2016, according to Freedom 
House6 data. The organization’s reports for 2016 and 2017 showed that both 
indicators of civil liberties and political rights followed an improving trend. Its 
index had gone from six to five, thus migrating from non-free to partially free 
classification. The 2017 report, however, already indicated that, as early as 2016, 
succession issues were creating conflict and confrontation within ZANU-PF 
itself. The Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA), 
Mugabe’s historical ally, withdrew its support for the President, accusing him 
of being dictatorial and blaming Grace for the country’s conflicts (FH 2017).
The fall of Mugabe
The crisis in Zimbabwe gradually became a crisis of leadership for 
Mugabe. The inner divisions of the party began to accentuate with the matter 
of the succession. As early as mid-2017, rumors began that Vice-President 
Mnangagwa would leave the government. Mnangagwa’s departure would be a 
reflection of the division of ZANU-PF into two groups: Team Lacoste7, which 
defended Mnangagwa as Mugabe’s successor in the upcoming elections; and 
Generation 40, which would not have a candidate for succession, but would 
be strong supporters of Grace Mugabe (Africa Confidential 2017).
Throughout the year, tensions within the administration increased, 
given the proximity of the following elections, expected to take place in 2018, 
and Mugabe’s unlikely continuity in power. The economic crisis, which was 
not new, was accentuated and used by Mugabe’s opponents within the party 
as a justification for the supposed renewal.
It is important to note that Mugabe was facing problems in his 
relations with the military. To a large extent, the military was also displeased 
6 Freedom House is an organization that carries out an annual monitoring of the political 
conditions of the countries in the world, producing a report and pointing out possible trends. 
It uses indicators of civil liberties and political rights, generating an index ranging from 
one to seven, one being totally free and seven non-free. According to Freedom House’s 
classification, a free country is one in which there is open political competition, respect for 
civil liberties, independent civic life, and independent media. In partially free countries, 
respect for civil liberties and political rights is limited; there is often an environment of 
corruption and/or ethnic and religious conflict, with a weak rule of law. In addition, there is a 
political scenario in which a party enjoys domination, despite a degree of political pluralism. 
Finally, non-free countries suffer from the absence of basic political rights and civil liberties.
7 The name is because of Mnangagwa’s nickname, Crocodile. 
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with the position of Grace Mugabe and her eventual path to her husband’s 
succession. Likewise, the Zimbabwean intelligence agency was also internally 
divided between supporters of a possible succession by Grace Mugabe and 
those who supported General Chiwenga as a strong government official and 
Mugabe’s natural successor (Cropley 2017).
In early November, moves for the withdrawal of Mugabe from 
administration became more evident. General Chiwenga, then Commander 
of the Zimbabwe Defense Forces, travelled to China to meet the Chinese 
Defense Minister. The visit aimed to seek support for the takeover and 
Mugabe’s deposition, on the grounds that a party group, supporter of 
Grace Mugabe, was planning actions to destabilize the armed forces (Africa 
Confidential 2017b).
Concurrently to Chiwenga’s trip, Mugabe disagreed with Mnangagwa, 
accusing him of provoking divisions in the party. Tensions between Mugabe 
and Mnangagwa widened, culminating in Mnangagwa’s withdrawal from the 
Vice-Presidency on November 6th. Mugabe stated that the vice-president was 
taking a disloyal conduct and therefore could not continue in his government.
Mnangagwa’s departure from the government was the starting point of 
a series of events that, in a few days, culminated in Mugabe’s downfall. On the 
one hand, Mugabe fired ministers close to Mnangagwa and threatened Chiwenga 
of prison when he returned to Zimbabwe. The opposition, in turn, continued to 
articulate for Mugabe’s deposition, including through public statements, such 
as that of Mnangagwa after his departure (Africa Confidential 2017b).
When he returned to national territory, Chiwenga blamed the party for 
the country’s economic problems and stated that the party’s problem were in 
the posture and actions of members who had not been in the war of liberation, 
in a clear reference to Generation 40, group supporting Grace Mugabe. At that 
moment, rumors began that Mugabe was trapped in his house.
On November 15th, General Sibusiso Moyo made a statement saying 
that Mugabe and his family were safe and well, and that the actions carried 
out by the country’s military were only aimed at arresting the criminals who 
were supposedly surrounding the President’s family and re-establishing order 
in the country. As of that day, the country would be under the government 
of the deposed vice-president, Mnangagwa.
Thus, a short period of transition and uncertainty began. For about 
a week, information on the crisis in Zimbabwe did not indicate a definitive 
resolution. Mugabe’s condition and posture were still unclear, and, although 
the moves indicated a possible waiver, there were no official statements. 
Simultaneously, popular demonstrations called for the resignation of the 
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President. And ZANU-PF members linked to Generation 40, including Grace 
Mugabe, were expelled from the party (International Crisis Group 2017).
On November 24th, after Mugabe’s resignation8, Mnangagwa officially 
took over the presidency of the country. Still in 2017, Chiwenga left the 
leadership of the military and became vice-president. Zimbabwe, thus, began 
2018 with a new government and promises of change and reform.
The new government was quickly accepted as legitimate by other 
states, including the African neighbors. It is noteworthy that SADC (2017b), 
whose own formation is strongly linked to the figure of Mugabe, recognized 
the new government in an official communique:
The Secretariat of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) congratulates His Excellency, Emmerson Dambudzo 
Mnangagwa, on his swearing in as President of the Republic of 
Zimbabwe. […] Today’s inauguration is significant for the people 
of Zimbabwe. SADC welcomes the reassuring message President 
Mnangagwa delivered to Zimbabweans on his arrival in Zimbabwe 
on 22 November 2017, in which he promised to lead the nation into 
a ‘new and unfolding democracy’, underscoring the need for unity 
among all Zimbabweans in growing the economy and ensuring peace 
and prosperity in their country.
On the other hand, on the same day, SADC (2017a) also launched a 
statement praising Mugabe “as a true champion of Pan-Africanism, and in 
the promotion of regional co-operation, development and integration” and 
recognizing as a right decision his resignation and withdrawal from power. 
It is clear, therefore, that if he tried to resist, Mugabe probably would not find 
support among his neighbors.
Mugabe’s departure from power was met with great euphoria by 
the international community, especially by Western countries. The end of 
the Mugabe era is expected to bring changes in the country’s politics and 
economy. The changes in leadership, however, do not seem to indicate actual 
major changes in the country’s political condition. It must be reminded that, 
although Mugabe has been removed from power, ZANU-PF remains the party 
in government. In addition, the new government took no action indicating 
any profound change in the way the country is run.
Some actors played a central role in the articulations that would lead to 
Mugabe’s deposition. Mutsvangwa, an ally of Mnangagwa, allegedly articulated 
8 It should be noted that when Mugabe resigned, the impeachment process was already 
being addressed by ZANU-PF itself, in agreement with the MDC.
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the change in power, both leading Mugabe to relent and rehabilitating the 
image of the armed forces in the country (Africa Confidential 2017c). In 
return, he would gain a position in the new government. His wife, Monica 
Mutsvangwa has already taken over the chair of the party’s Women’s League, 
which was formerly Grace Mugabe’s.
The main figure in this transition of power, however, was Chiwenga, 
who articulated ‘Operation Restore Legacy’ for the seizure of power. Chiwenga 
fulfilled the role of mediator with external forces, securing the support of one 
of Zimbabwe’s main political and economic partners, China. In addition, he 
mobilized the military forces so that Mugabe’s withdrawal could take place.
On an official visit to Mozambique in January 2018, Mnangagwa 
announced that elections would take place in 4 or 5 months. The President 
confirmed that Commonwealth observers will be invited, along with UN 
observers, to follow the electoral process. The announcement of the elections, 
at first, adds to the idea that this would just be a transitional government 
until the elections.
As mentioned earlier, the elections are scheduled for August 2018. In 
addition to ZANU-PF and MDC, main opposition party, two other parties are 
expected to compete: one led by ZANU-PF’s former vice-president, Joice Mujuru; 
and the other a MDC dissident, led by Elton Mangoma (Africa Confidential 
2017c). The undertaking of the elections, however, although already announced 
by the president, is still nebulous. This is due to the country’s own history of 
political instability and the absence of independent and reliable institutions.
According to Fabricius (2018), Mnangagwa and ZANU-PF would 
probably win the elections, given the political capital gained from the seizure 
of power and the opposition’s own division, with the weakening of the MDC. 
Added to that is the death of Tsvangirai, MDC’s top leadership and the party’s 
likely presidential candidate.
Mnangagwa, however, is not unanimous, neither in the country nor 
in ZANU-PF. It must be reminded that the Generation 40 group remains a 
point of support for Grace Mugabe, opposed to Mnangagwa’s presidency. 
In some provinces, in which the Generation 40 has greater insertion, the 
figure of Mnangagwa is not well accepted. On the other hand, Mnangagwa is 
supposed to have the support of England. Even though it denies this support 
officially, the British diplomatic body made visits to Mnangagwa and there are 
already signs that Zimbabwe would be accepted back into the Commonwealth9 
(Fabricius 2018). The return to the Commonwealth would be conditional upon 
9 The country is indefinitely suspended from the Commonwealth since the 2002 elections, 
considered illegitimate.
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the government accepting an election observation mission, which would, 
in the eyes of the West, ensure greater credibility to the elections than just 
an African Union mission. This explains Mnangagwa’s statement when he 
visited Mozambique.
The very context in which Mnangagwa ascended to power adds to these 
questions. Despite the acceptance of the other countries and the resignation 
of Mugabe, the process can also be understood as a coup, articulated by the 
military and with external support, for the overthrow of Mugabe. Aiming, among 
other things, to get rid of this image, Mnangagwa has maintained a friendly 
relationship with Mugabe, even making complimentary public statements.
According to Matyszak (2018), Mnangagwa would defend the narrative 
of ‘military-assisted transition’, in which the target was not Mugabe, but the 
criminals who surrounded him, including his wife, Grace. Mnangagwa’s aim 
would not only be to maintain a good image for ZANU-PF voters, but also 
to avoid condemnation of neighbors and regional organizations, especially 
SADC and the African Union.
Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe
Mugabe’s withdrawal from power, after 37 years in Zimbabwe’s 
government, is undoubtedly a major change. The Mugabe figure represents 
a generation of leaders who fought against the colonial presence in Africa 
and against the apartheid regime in South Africa. During the 1980s, he was 
the great leadership of Southern Africa, a position which, since the 90s, after 
the end of apartheid, began to be disputed by Mandela. The long history of 
economic crisis has not prevented Mugabe from continuing to defend his 
position as the region’s legitimate leader and even calling on that historic 
role as a means of maintaining the support of his neighbors and avoiding 
public condemnation of his actions.
The implementation of major changes is not the general expectation. 
In the words of Southall (2017, 83):
Certainly, Zimbabweans had few illusions that Mnangagwa was intent 
on launching a transition to democracy, although many had hopes 
that he would drive sufficient reforms to render life more tolerable 
than it had been during the last days of Mugabe.
The very fulfilment of elections would be a factor of skepticism among 
the population of Zimbabwe. While a part of the population recognizes the 
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importance of the election as a form of legitimization of the mandate, another 
portion believes that, without the necessary reforms in the legislation, the 
elections would bring no significant change in the conditions of the country 
(International Crisis Group 2017).
The figure of Mnangagwa, as mentioned earlier, also does not 
bring high hopes of changes in the country’s leadership. As Southall 
(2017) points out, Mnangagwa, one of the ZANU-PF’s armed wing leaders 
before independence, was one of the main idealizers of the security state 
implemented in Zimbabwe. He was the one who commanded the acts of 
violence and persecution against the opposition in the 2008 elections. It 
should be noted that before assuming the Vice-Presidency, Mnangagwa was 
Minister of Defense.
A first indication that Mnangagwa will not carry out significant 
reforms is the composition of his cabinet. All nominees are members of 
ZANU-PF; some, even, held positions during the governments of Mugabe. 
Of note is the appointment of General Moyo as Foreign Minister, one of the 
first to give public statements supporting military action for the withdrawal of 
Mugabe. In addition, Mugabe’s own withdrawal of power can be understood 
as a strategy for maintaining the country’s structure and conduct, given 
that Grace Mugabe’s influence was not well seen by the party’s traditional 
leadership. Her influence on Mugabe, therefore, would mean an unwanted 
change (Melber 2017).
For Southall (2017), the cabinet formed by Mnangagwa, rather than 
indicating continuity, evidences the influence of the military forces on the 
process and indicates that they will remain present in the government. It should 
be noted that, besides the indications to the cabinet previously mentioned, the 
Vice-Presidency was occupied by Chiwenga, confirming this influence.
From an economic point of view, it is possible that some changes, 
however small, will be made. Obviously, it is not possible to separate the 
economic sphere from the political sphere and the possible progress 
Mnangagwa can make economically, especially through external resources, 
depend on a good progress of this political transition. The starting point 
should be the holding of elections, free and recognized as such by international 
observers, still in 2018. 
The problem lies in the actions required for elections to occur within 
acceptable standards. Some minimal reforms that should take place are: 
measures to ensure the credibility of the voters list, independence of the 
Electoral Commission and the elimination of the Executive’s power to veto 
observers of the Electoral Observation Missions (International Crisis Group 
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2017). It is likely, however, that a majority of Mnangagwa’s cabinet members 
will be against such reforms. 
The holding of elections, without Mugabe and with possible reforms 
in the legislation, puts a spotlight on the forces of opposition. The main 
opposition group, the MDC, is facing internal disputes after Tsvangirai’s 
death. In addition, there are dissident groups, which fragment the opposition, 
making the way easier for ZANU-PF. 
External influences should also be considered in the context of 
Zimbabwe’s crisis. It is important to note that China denies any involvement 
in the process leading to Mugabe’s withdrawal from power. There are no 
formal statements from any country admitting knowledge of what was being 
planned in Zimbabwe. In any case, the absence of mentions or accusations of 
coup in the official announcements of the countries indicates that, possibly, 
neighboring countries and China itself already had information on the 
situation and, to some extent, understood Mugabe’s departure as acceptable. 
China’s relationship with Zimbabwe is historic and dates back from 
before the country’s independence, when China supported the liberation 
movement led by Mugabe. The proximity between Harare and Beijing has 
thrived over the years. Currently, China is the main foreign investor in the 
country, with investments in several areas, especially infrastructure and 
natural resources (Nunoo 2017). In addition, Zimbabwe is China’s second 
largest trading partner in the African continent in absolute terms, only behind 
South Africa (Hogwe and Banda 2017). 
One cannot forget that one of the foundational stones of Chinese 
foreign policy is non-interference in other countries’ domestic affairs10. It is 
this principle that underlies China’s relationship with several African countries 
suffering sanctions from Western countries. One of the main characteristics 
of China-Africa relations is not to condition economic relations to demands 
for political change. The exception is the One China policy, namely the need 
to recognize Taiwan as part of China and not as an independent territory.
This Chinese position, in the case of Zimbabwe, indicates two 
important conclusions. The first is that it is highly unlikely that Beijing will 
make any official statement on possible support for the process that removed 
Mugabe from power. Although China was aware of what would happen, 
10 The outline of China’s foreign policy lies in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 
established in December 1953, by Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, during the China-
India peace talks on Tibet. The Five Principles are mutual respect for sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual 
benefits, and peaceful coexistence.
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bearing in mind the visit of Chiwenga a few days before the beginning of the 
crisis, this fact will not have official confirmation. The second conclusion is 
that, regardless of who is in power or any changes that may be implemented 
by Mnangagwa, relations between China and Zimbabwe should remain 
unchanged. 
From the regional point of view, it is important to highlight the position 
of South Africa. South Africa, as mentioned, acted as a mediator, indicated by 
SADC, in the previous crises of Zimbabwe. Its performance was marked by a 
rather hesitant stance, with no public condemnation of the Mugabe government 
and a quieter action. The reaction of Pretoria to Mugabe’s departure from power 
did not change this history. Accompanying the position of the SADC and the 
African Union, the South African government recognized as legitimate the 
transition process led by the military and the new Mnangagwa government. 
It should be noted that at that time the African National Congress was also 
experiencing a period of tension, with internal divisions and succession 
problems that would culminate in the resignation of Jacob Zuma. 
Final Remarks
Many African countries are marked by long-term governments of 
a single leader, as was the case in Angola and Zimbabwe. The impact of 
this absence of alternation in power is notorious, with clear restrictions on 
democratic freedoms and frequent internal conflicts. The departure of a ruler 
from power, however, does not necessarily mean change in the conduct of 
government. The end of the Mugabe era in Zimbabwe was not the end of 
the ZANU-PF era. 
The fact that the government was taken over by the former vice-
president, who also formed a Cabinet with members from the Mugabe 
government, is an important indication that Zimbabwe’s leadership change 
is unlikely to bring about major changes for the country. ZANU-PF remains 
in power and with it the vast majority of those who have led the policies of 
the Mugabe government. Mugabe’s own withdrawal of power, led by the 
military, was orchestrated to keep the traditional forces in power and prevent 
a possible rise to power of the group led by Grace Mugabe.  
The stance of neighboring countries confirms the view that 
Zimbabwe’s institutional conditions will most likely be maintained, at least 
in the short term. Both South Africa, one of the main leaders in the region, 
and the regional organizations directly involved – SADC and the African 
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Union – quickly recognized the new government as legitimate. Such a 
position indicates not only the acceptance of the process that culminated 
in Mugabe’s resignation, but also the understanding that there is no major 
break going on, whether positive or not. It is important to remember that 
South Africa itself is also facing a situation of instability, although there are 
no indications of institutional problems, with the resignation of Jacob Zuma, 
after the pressures of the African National Congress. 
Thus, despite Western pressures for democratizing reforms in 
Zimbabwe, especially with regard to electoral legislation, there is no indication 
that such changes will actually take place. Even if the 2018 elections are 
confirmed, which is likely to happen, they should not guarantee change. It is 
important to remember that elections have always been held in the country, 
although they have often not been recognized as legitimate by external 
observers. The 2018 election should take place in a context of the strengthening 
of ZANU-PF by recent events and, once again, fragmentation and weakening 
of the opposition, with the divisions of the MDC and Tsvangirai’s death. The 
end of the Mugabe era, thus, does not end the control of the former forces 
in power. 
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ABSTRACT
In November 2017, after 37 years, Robert Mugabe’s government ended in Zimbabwe. 
This change in power is a milestone in the history of the country and of the African 
continent as a whole. The aim of the present article is to analyze the factors that 
conditioned Mugabe’s fall from power as well as possible changes in the country’s 
political context. It is assumed that the country’s external relations, combined with 
the internal divisions of the party, have conditioned the crisis that culminated in the 
end of Mugabe’s rule. The stance of non-interference in domestic affairs of its African 
neighbors and Zimbabwe’s main economic partner, China, had enabled Mugabe 
to remain in power for nearly four decades, but also allowed that the transition 
to Mnangagwa, assisted by the military, occurred without major intercurrences. 
ZANU-PF’s internal disputes, fueled by the increasing need for Mugabe to indicate 
a successor, gradually weakened Mugabe’s power and created new alliances. The 
change in the leading figure of the country, however, does not seem to indicate 
significant changes in the political conditions of the country, although some changes 
in the conduct of the economy might occur.
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